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The Roots of “Penal Populism”: 
the Role of Media and Politics1
M A R G A R I T A  D o B R y n I n A
InTRoDUcTIon
Penal populism is often labeled as a process whereby politicians devise pu-
nitive penal policies, which are adjudged to be “popular” within the general 
public, and are designed to mobilize votes rather than improve the crime and 
justice situation. A “tough on crime” policy stance is usually most manifest 
during election campaigns. 
This definitional assessment, however, is overly simplified, and does not 
reflect the complexity of the actual issue which, in true fact, is “[…] represent-
ing a major shift in the configuration of penal power in modern society, rather 
than something within the purview of politicians to tinker with as they please” 
(Pratt 2007, p. 8). Pratt notes that instead of designating political manipula-
tions in order to increase votes, penal populism denotes major social and cul-
tural changes of the 1970s, which are reflected and continue to take place in 
the modern society.
From a sociological perspective, Shils (1956) and canovan (1981) observed 
that populism represents not the general public opinion, but the feelings, voic-
es, and moods of those societal segments that were neglected and left out by 
the authorities, i. e., by those in power in favor of the “less worthy others.” In 
this sense, populism reflects the dissatisfaction and alienation of underrepre-
1 This article is based on the study first reported in the framework of the research project 
FIDUcIA (new European crimes and Trust-based Policy), funded primarily by the 
European commission under the 7th Framework programme for Research.   
DoI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/crimLithuan.201??????
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sented segments of society. At the same time, populism functionally criticizes 
those sectors of society which allowed the mistreatment and social oversight 
to occur by “[…] engineering this marginalization of disenfranchisement of 
‘ordinary people’” (Pratt 2007, p. 9). The sectors responsible for this usually 
include governmental institutions/bureaucracies, a self-serving parliamentary 
process and different elite groups, which advise or influence government ac-
tors (i.e., academics, judiciary, media). 
All together, these forces represent “the establishment,” which claims to 
speak “on behalf of the people” concerning all matters, including the devel-
opment of penal policy. It should be noted that punishment and its provi-
sion resides in the discourse of the “power field” as well as in politics directly. 
Thus, the demand of certain interest groups to make punishments more severe 
might designate a public claim for power or might be used in order to create an 
impression of holding power. In this case, the role of the mass media is crucial. 
It not only shapes, consolidates and directs public attitudes, but also mediates 
itself as the “true voice” of the ordinary people.
METHoDoLoGy
In order to better understand the manifestation of penal populism in the 
media and its interrelation with politics, this article relied upon qualitative 
discourse analysis, mostly looking at mass media from P. Bourdieu’s perspec-
tive of a “social field.” This approach best enables an examination of ideologies 
and power relations involved in discourse. The critical distinguisher from this 
view is the role of language, as a form of social practice, which focuses on the 
ways social and political dominance are reproduced in texts and talks. This 
approach determines the interpretative nature of the analysis.  
The empirical research of this study was based on the Lithuanian media 
coverage of a crime story – a pedophile scandal.  The research begins with the 
very first article, which appeared on this issue in the media in August 2009. 
The research also focuses upon media reporting impact on criminal justice 
institutions and the changes in public attitudes toward them as a result of a 
media-constructed “moral panic.” This particular case was chosen because it 
was the only case in the history of Lithuanian media to be reported with such 
intensity and for such an extensive period of time (2009-2012). It also perfectly 
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demonstrated the consequences of media-generated moral panics and their 
impact on society at large. 
Media coverage of the pedophilia scandal herein refers to the information 
presented by the media in relation to the alleged case of sexual abuse of a pre-
teen girl. The father of the child, D. Kedys, accused three persons as the perpe-
trators of the alleged crime, including a judge, a businessman with ties to the 
political system and an anonymous perpetrator. As the alleged accessories to 
the crime, he named the mother of the child and her sister, accusing them of 
pandering the child for sexual exploitation in return for financial gain.
The mass media content analysis included a review of:
•	 the	most	popular	Lithuanian	internet	news	media	publications;		
•	 the	 television	 “info-shows”	 of	 the	 three	 Lithuanian	 main	 broadcast	
channels. 
Within this frame, the overall sample size was 800 internet articles – 574 
articles directly dedicated to the pedophile scandal; 73 articles where the pedo-
phile scandal theme was peripheral to the main topic of the publication; 153 
articles about other pedophile cases. The period of media monitoring of the 
pedophile case coverage was August 17, 2009 to September 30, 2010, starting 
with the appearance of the first article on the pedophile scandal in the internet 
media. The final sample chosen for discourse analysis was comprised of the ar-
ticles that had received the greatest attention from readers during the research 
period. Popularity in this instance was determined by the number of com-
ments left on individual articles in each month of the 13-month research cycle 
with the top 13 articles, one per month selected for a closer review. The articles 
were analyzed by qualitative content analysis, concentrating on the interrela-
tion of different social fields involved in the framing of the discourse. This 
involved fixating specific categories, such as the social actors, their position in 
the field, rhetoric used, importance given in the article (whether the actor was 
mentioned in the title); also, it was examined which conceptual frames were 
competing in the public discourse and, consequently, giving meaning to it (i.e., 
“faulty system,” “blocked opportunities,” “social breakdown,” “racist system,” 
and “violent media”) (Surette 2011, p. 38-40).2
2 The “faulty system” argues that crime emerges from an inefficient and lenient criminal 
justice system, which urgently needs to “get tough” on crime. The “blocked opportuni-
ties” frame argues that the roots of the crime-and-justice problems lie in the poverty 
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considering the restrictions of accessing television program records, the 
scope of the analysis included 19 television shows on the coverage of this par-
ticular crime story during the research period: october 1, 2009 to December 
31, 2010.  The analysis was used to illustrate that media is an arena where 
power can be concentrated and exercised. In this instance, it reflected the mo-
nopolization of the crime problem by certain interest groups – “claim-makers.” 
However, it should equivalently be noted that the specific nature of these tel-
evision programs as “info-shows” had an important impact on determining 
the participating actors. Television program records were analyzed according 
to the following categories: name, date, duration, number of comments, dura-
tion of comments, number and duration of comments according to their type 
(public/professional/political), and role/profession of the commentator.  
It should be restated that the media discourse analysis was enriched with 
Bourdieu’s approach, particularly with the notion of a social field where penal 
populism can be exercised and penal attitudes can be reinforced and mediated 
to the society. The chosen research approach enabled a better assessment of 
which social actors were “empowered” to comment on the pedophilia scandal, 
and to assess the ideological motives of the selection of program participants.
“PEnAL PoPULISM”: THE InTERRELATIon  
oF MASS MEDIA AnD PoLITIcAL FIELDS
Bourdieu argues that mass media is gaining more and more power in so-
ciety, and becoming a major factor in the political struggle, precisely at the 
time that it is falling under the ever-growing influence and control of politics 
(politicians) and economics. In this case, the more invisible and anonymous 
economic pressure of market forces often has a more harmful effect than open 
and inequality issues. Thus, the advocated means of solving the problem usually are 
connected to fighting unemployment, poverty, community development etc. The “social 
breakdown” frame sees the causes of crime in a family and community breakdown. The 
solution is seen in strengthening family values, communities, citizen involvement. The 
“racist system” argues that the problem lies in the discriminatory operation of the crimi-
nal justice system, which need to become more sensitive to the racial justice issues, and 
calls for empowerment of discriminated groups. The “violent media” frame argues that 
violent crime in particular stems from the violence portrayed in the mass media, and 
calls for more governmental control of produced violent media content.   
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political censorship, which journalists can consciously resist (бурдье 2002, 
p. 12). Bourdieu emphasizes that “symbolic power,” which was previously iso-
lated from political and economic power, is increasingly concentrated in the 
hands of the few. By symbolic power, Bourdieu means the power to define, clas-
sify, create and impose specific social concepts and desirable system models of 
state and society; the power to define and classify. In other words, large corpora-
tions, who simultaneously own mass media and the means for the production 
and dissemination of cultural goods, offer similar market logic to everyone via 
television channels, publishing groups, internet companies etc. Thus, cultural 
goods, including information about crime and criminal justice – are treated like 
any other commodity. As a result, information on crime is made to conform to 
common economic indicators, the most important of which is profit.
In the case of the pedophilia scandal in Lithuania, mass media, using a 
“market logic-oriented” news production practice, created a brand, the “logo” 
of which the main story “hero” was D. Kedys. The positioning of this brand 
in the public consciousness was ensured not only by an intense mass media 
escalation of the pedophilia story, but also through its penetration into other 
forms of discourse:
•	 Some	virtual	D.	Kedys	support	communities	were	created	in	the	social	
media;
•	 Commercial	television	produced	TV	series	dedicated	to	this	story;
•	 Online	news	portals	launched	separate	columns:	“The	Story	of	D. Kedys”	
and “The case of D. Kedys”;   
•	 D.	Kedys’	character	also	appeared	in	children’s	comics.			
Quite often, mass media portrayed D. Kedys in a purple shirt, which turned 
this color into a symbol for “pedophile fighters.” coincidentally, this coincided 
with this color’s rise in 2009 fashion trends.  certain “style fans” of D. Kedys’ 
image had also emerged. The proponents of D. Kedys started initiatives to cre-
ate a political party.  Finally, a “D. Kedys brand” was used in food menus and 
slogans.
Direct market competition is an inevitable and integral characteristic of 
the mass media business model. Since, as a result, the commercial success and 
continuity of a television program depends on ratings, any effort to build truly 
rational and enlightened public opinion is a secondary consideration to pack-
aging a salable story. This, of course, is contrary to what some media dema-
gogues try to convince the public (бурдье 2002, p. 88). 
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Taking into account both the peculiarities of the logic of the journalistic 
field, which focuses on the production of a short-term validity product (crime 
news do also fit within the context of this work), and the competitive strug-
gle for the attention of the consumer, the competition is high amongst media 
agencies for the most sensationalist news. The stronger this competition is, the 
closer the television channel (or other means of mass communication) is to a 
commercial pole, where consumer attention, in a more direct manner, links 
to the profit side of the media/marketing revenue model, thus increasing the 
economic salability and viability of the media enterprise. During the research 
period, for example, there was strong competition between the two lead Lithu-
anian commercial television stations, each offering their assortment of offer-
ings (i.e., the pedophilia scandal stories). 
In this case, Bourdieu emphasizes the danger of market competition on 
cultural production.  He argues that instead of promoting the diversity of sup-
ply (in this case, a diverse array of news stories), market competition leads to 
a form of standardization, which is particularly noticeable on television and 
in the press. Media groups, seeking to increase profits and stay competitive, 
produce entertainment shows designed to grasp the largest audience share. 
Herein, the manifestations of penal populism fully correspond with the genre 
and logic of the “show scenario.” others follow suit, leading to a general ho-
mogenization of available programing. The same competition evokes a simi-
lar homogenization in news coverage as was observed during the analysis of 
TV programs in the case presented herein. First, the three principal public 
TV channels, LTV, TV3 and LnK broadcasted similar, competing journalistic 
programs – The Journalist’s Investigation, Confrontation and On Both Sides of 
the Wall. More direct competition was observed between two commercial tel-
evision channels. Both commercial broadcasters competed intensively to shed 
light on the pedophilia story, each offering diametrically opposed opinions 
and content in order to find and build its client audience. However, since the 
battle for the audience and ratings leads to the commercialization of the news, 
the interests of shareholders predominate. In the process, crime news, along-
side all cultural content, reproduce and legitimize the ideology of political and 
economic interest groups, who possess the symbolic power.
Thus, and in spite of the potential positive impact of public discussions 
of criminal or other social problems in the media, the result is often the con-
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trary, given the influences under which journalists consciously and, perhaps, 
unconsciously function (бурдье 2002, p. 16). From this starting place, the sys-
tem continues to turn on itself. Influenced media reporting strongly influences 
politicians, law enforcement representatives, public figures and the interface 
between them and the public, which itself responds to media controlled con-
tent (бурдье 2002, p. 17). Since market pressure is rarely directly correlated 
with media content in this or other spheres, instead of becoming a support 
for informed democracy, mass media becomes a mechanism of democratic 
subversion. 
The analysis of TV programs clearly shows how participant content is con-
trolled via time constraints, program format and script, message oversight (to 
ensure it is not sophisticated beyond the presumed reach of the general public) 
etc. This practice simultaneously narrows the scope of discussion and those 
capable of presenting it.
Television producers and directors, by prioritizing the sensational, define 
information and how to interpret it. As the market-engendered spiral contin-
ues, competing television media groups increasingly rely on “tabloid” media 
tactics, devoted principally to chronicle events and sports news (бурдье 2002, 
69). Within this format, criminal news, disasters and the genre of similar in-
formation do not require any special competence – certainly not a political 
one – to deliver. Bourdieu emphasizes that this form of chronicling of events 
creates a political emptiness, depoliticizes and downgrades political life to the 
level of jokes or gossip. Without a political barometer to interpret evens, pub-
lic attention is easily switched to focus on matters of limited political conse-
quences; these consequences, however, are dramatized so that the public can 
“learn” from them or that they are conversely presented as “social problems” 
(бурдье 2002, p. 70).
For this purpose, “media philosophers” or other persons of status in the 
public sphere often are paraded to give a special meaning to the “coinciden-
tal crime occurrence,” which is artificially embedded into the media’s agenda 
priorities to give it the status of a “significant event.” For example, journalists 
invite academics, important public figures and politicians to their programs 
or ask for interviews in order to create an image of intellectualism and profes-
sionalism, which, in turn, legitimizes the overall program as objective, unbi-
ased and focused on getting to the truth on a matter predetermined by the 
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media to be of importance, given its capacity to pull public attention, thus 
revenue as well. In short, this format commoditizes the news, but does so in 
a way that it carries a flavor of both legitimacy, unbiasedness and importance 
and, in the process, drives ratings and revenue upward.  
In the case of the Lithuania pedophilia story researched herein, internet 
media articles and TV programs took this exact approach in transforming an 
“accidental event” into a “social problem.” They accomplished this by using 
claim-makers and “media philosophers” to comment on the particular case in 
a manner that validated it and legitimized it as an actual social problem. They 
accomplished this by highlighting and reconstructing certain facts, which can 
lead to tremendous interest, gratifying the most primitive human impulses 
and desires (бурдье 2002, p. 70). 
For example, stories of child sexual exploitation and abuse tend to stimulate 
national rage. Thus, contemporary means of mass communication, which stir 
and exploit the lowest lusts (violence, carnal instincts), can augment the out-
breaks of hatred toward certain social groups (pedophiles, homosexuals etc.) 
and lead to popular requests for increasing punishment and control (“limits 
of pain”) over them. Simultaneously, according to Bourdieu, the mass media 
coverage of such type of events like the pedophilia scandal might induce vari-
ous types of emotionally-driven, popular responses and actions. Responses in 
such an instance will range from exceptionally sentimental and compassionate 
toward the victims and aggressive, to the point of symbolic lynching, toward 
those considered responsible. 
The pedophilia scandal is a case in point as it is particularly common that 
such stories and events describe the cruel treatment of children by stigmatized 
groups (for instance, pedophiles).  of course, the responsibility for societal 
response partly falls on the journalists for their form and style of presenting 
the pedophilia scandal. clearly, however, their actions are simply opportunis-
tic responses to events as they occur.  Their culpability relates to the manner 
in which they choose to interpret events and the implications thereof. This 
culpability is more systemic than individual, as the journalists work within the 
socioeconomic construct of the media industry and its interface with society 
and the state. That is precisely why, if we are to understand the construction of 
punitive attitudes in public discourse (which are based on the knowledge that 
one possesses about crime reality), it is critical to be well versed in the logic of 
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the journalism field. If one understands the structural mechanisms that pro-
mote journalistic cynicism and lead to the pursuit of sensationalism, one can 
promote conscious action to control and neutralize these negative effects. Si-
multaneously, the disclosure and spread of the awareness about these practices 
and their effect could help mitigate their manipulative impact on society at 
large (бурдье 2002, p. 74).
The coverage of the pedophile scandal in the Lithuanian media shows what 
impact does the pressure of journalists and, hence, the journalistic field can have 
on the performance of the criminal justice system, including any pressures for 
the delegation of legal and particularly judicial powers away from state actors. 
Mass media overstepped its authority and attempted to enter directly into the 
“legal universe.” At different moments, journalists, hosts and correspondents as-
sumed the functions of a judge. They passed “judgments” on law enforcement 
institutions by labeling them in any of the following way: “indifferent, passive, 
negligent, incompetent.” They would also chide the institutions and prompt 
them to “take the responsibility,” as well as to “be reformed” etc.
This form of mediatic intervention can be very dangerous. It is understood 
that the media needs the public and the public needs the media. As noted prior, 
for the media, the public is also a consumer to whom its capacity to influence 
through cultural production supports the market economy and the viability of 
the media as a private sector institution through advertising and sales. The pub-
lic needs the media for information. However, when such information is dis-
tilled in a manner which focuses, first and foremost, on sensationalism to drive a 
greater market share (as profits for advertisers and investors, too), then the sup-
posed mission of the media – to inform – is subjugated to a purely business logic. 
During the research period, there were few comments made attacking 
journalistic meddling into the pedophile case investigation process, accusing 
the media of provoking society’s reaction in the public discourse.  The me-
dia’s response was predictably based on the argument that it is a matter of 
professional and civil conscience to shed light on the events of this nature, 
raise awareness, disclose “villains” and contribute to the restoration of dam-
aged social order. 
While there may have been truth in the intent of such statements, as this 
model notes, the media no longer possesses the objectivity or the professional 
capacity to effectively intervene in these spheres in a manner which is benefi-
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cial to society. Bourdieu points out that in today’s cynical world, a lot of focus 
is on talking about conscience. However, conscience is only “effective” when it 
is based on the structures and mechanisms that lead people to willingly com-
ply with the moral norms. In this case, and in counter distinction, the de-
pendence of the journalistic field on market pressure predetermines certain 
criteria of professional activity and predisposes the standards of “professional 
conscience.” In order for the conscience “to get concerned” and be correctly 
oriented, it requires a better-educated audience, aware of media manipula-
tions. However, popular confidence rates in mass media and indicators show-
ing mass media (especially television) as the main source of information about 
criminal problems indicates that public resistance to the economic game rules 
of mass media is very low. 
Journalists, due to the internal ideological factors of information produc-
tion, are not enabled to keep a rational distance, which is necessary for rea-
soning to occur. This, of course, amplifies the problem. In a sense, and in this 
context, the public witnessed the overriding cynicism of the mass media as an 
industry by the escalation of the pedophilia story, via the following actions: 
•	 Intensively	educating	the	public	about	the	core	“social	vices”;
•	 Loudly	disclosing	“villains”;	
•	 Passing	strict	sentences	on	certain	“offenders”	and	then	shifting	sides.
Through these means, mass media falsely presented itself as a protector of 
humanist values whilst simultaneously carrying out market-based mass ma-
nipulation. Such media maneuvering is possible, in part, because the intense 
quantity and flow of information in the “knowledge society” exacerbates a 
chronic social illness – “memory amnesia.”
At the same time, this situation shows that by channeling and mobiliz-
ing information, mass media contributes to the consolidation of a “perverse 
direct democracy,” principally by failing to maintain essential distance from 
what is defined as “news of the day” and public pressure, which is not neces-
sarily democratic in nature (бурдье 2002, p. 84). The information provided 
in the public discourse about the pedophilia scandal – “bad news” – could be 
compared to nails that were hammered daily into the people’s conscious and 
subconscious; the more of those nails were delivered – the angrier the person 
would get. This occurrence sets the scope for a resulting decline in public toler-
ance and humanity.
108 ISSn 2351-6097    KRIMInoLo GIJoS STUDIJoS    2016/4
 It should be noted that during the coverage of the pedophilia scandal, 
there was a simultaneous increase in public dissatisfaction with public au-
thorities, and an intensification of homophobic sentiment (fear of otherness) 
etc. These events were also covered by various mass media sources: Politicians 
Choose Public Figure Masks (www.delfi.com, 2010 09 15), Public Incitement to 
Beat Gays Received the Attention of Prosecutors (www.delfi.lt, 2010 03 17), In 
Vilnius – Drastic Incitement to Protest Against the Gay Parade (www.delfi.lt, 
2010 05 05) etc.  
It is important to note that, under normal conditions, “maintenance of the 
necessary distance” should be guaranteed by the relatively independent politi-
cal field logic. However, the pedophilia scandal in public discourse incited the 
opposite. Here, representatives of the political field became participants in the 
mass media-created narrative, thus legitimating both their own and the me-
dia’s right to professional legal discourse. Therefore, in this context, we could 
discuss the mediatization of the political and legal fields, which points to the 
limited actual autonomy of those fields. In short, such interaction by journal-
ists with politicians and law enforcement representatives weakens the bounda-
ries between these groups. Arguably, it also modifies the functional and dis-
tinguishable role of politicians and law enforcement officers, which become 
enmeshed by the logic of the journalistic field market.
The analysis of internet news media and television revealed which social 
agents were given the right to comment on the pedophilia scandal and simul-
taneously which had the right to provide their definitions of the situation. To 
“fight” with the prevailing revenge logic in the pedophilia scandal narrative 
was relegated to legal and political logic. The logic of the political field not only 
did not help to maintain the necessary distance, but integrated into, according 
to S. cohen’s terminology, the deviance amplification spiral, partly legitimat-
ing society’s “rage” (cohen 2002).  
According to the analysis of selected TV programs, the pedophilia scandal 
was mostly politicized on the commercial channel TV3’s show Confrontation. 
on four out of the nine programs (2010 09 22, 2010 10 13, 2010 10 27, 2010 
11 24) the participants were politicians (members of the Seimas). on one of 
the shows (2010 10 27), three out of ten participants were the representatives 
of the political field (i.e, two members of the Seimas and a presidential spokes-
person).
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conversely, on the LnK channel show On Both Sides of the Wall, in only 
one out of nine episodes did there appear a political commentary by a mem-
ber of the Seimas (2009 10 14). In contrast, in the national broadcaster’s LTV 
show The Journalist’s Investigation, no politician was invited to comment on 
the event in the only episode that was dedicated to pedophilia scandal. How-
ever, in terms of the political actors who have commented on the pedophilia 
scandal on the TV3 show Confrontation, which opted for the so called “pro-
Kedys” position, it should be noted that two of these actors’ opinions were also 
quite actively highlighted on the analyzed online news portal Delfi.lt.
During the overall research period, the following political field representa-
tives were most mentioned in the headlines of the news portal: President Dalia 
Grybauskaite (15 publications and 2 publications in the headlines indicating 
the President’s advisor), Minister of Justice Remigijus Šimašius (7 publica-
tions), chairman of the Seimas Irena Degutienė (6 publications) and chair-
man of the committee on Legal Affairs Stasys Šedbaras (5 publications). The 
speeches on the pedophilia scandal issue of the representatives of the political 
field could be attributed to the so-called popular or mass rhetoric, which has 
become a modern presidential ruling tool. Active speaking of the head of the 
state in public discourse often indicates the tendencies of the “presidentization” 
of political culture, which, as claimed, is reflected in the Lithuanian public dis-
course on crime and criminal justice. Usually, political culture is dominated by 
“presidentization” or “parliamentarization” trends. The “parliamentarization” 
trends are perfectly reflected in the headline of this publication about the then-
Prime Minister of the Republic of Lithuania: A . Kubilius: The Government Will 
Not Interfere in D . Kedys Daughter’s Story (www.delfi.lt, 2010 05 20).
However, it should be noted that during the periods of “moral panic,” high-
er ratings are generally registered by those politicians who speak publicly on 
media agenda issues, and politicians using a populist “tough hand” rhetoric, 
for example: 
•	 The President is Not Satisfied With the Investigation of D . Kedys Daugh-
ter’s Case (www.delfi.lt, 2009 10 12), D. Grybauskaitė [President of the 
Republic of Lithuania];
•	 I Am Taking a Greater Responsibility Than the Constitution Assumes 
(www.delfi.lt, 2009 10 20), D. Grybauskaitė;
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•	 I Am Expecting Stricter Decisions Concerning the Prosecutors (2009 10 
26), I . Degutienė [chairman of the Lithuanian Seimas] Questions the 
Court Decision on D . Kedys’ Case and the Bailiff ’s Conduct (www.delfi.
lt, 2010 05 19).
It is interesting to note that during the period of moral panic, public dis-
trust and anger, the trust ratings of the two mentioned main governmental 
authorities were quite high. At the same time, the Prime Minister took a low 
profile on the pedophilia scandal, appearing only four times. Interestingly, and 
contrary to the President and the chairman of the Lithuanian Seimas, who 
were extensively quoted, the Prime Minister, from the perspective of politi-
cal marketing, chose an unpopular attitude. His comments focused on other 
things, among them the following:
•	 How	to	protect	the	“faulty	system”;
•	 The	“prosecution	service	has	problems;	however,	everything	shouldn’t	
be assessed by one case”; “noncompliance with a court decision is a 
crime”;
•	 “The	government	will	not	intervene	in	the	story	of	D.	Kedys’	daughter.”	
of course, politicians’ ratings are influenced by many factors, but it is clear 
that such comments by the Prime Minister during the times of public distrust 
in government and especially law enforcement institutions did not promote 
the populist mobilization of the electorate. Related or not, during the research 
period, the Prime Minister remained one of the most unpopular politicians in 
the country.
While, according to R. Koženiauskienė’s political language typology, the 
speech of the Head of the State, who was one of the social actors (politicians) 
most actively commenting on the pedophilia scandal in the political field, 
could be attributed to military rhetoric (Koženiauskienė 2001). This type of 
rhetoric is characterized by the brevity of speech, being laconic, a usage of 
“active” verbs and quite imperative first-person forms. This includes various 
comments, some of which are given below: 
•	 “The	President	House	promises”;
•	 “The	President	is	unhappy”;
•	 “Lately	deciding	to	fire	not	one	judge”;
•	 “Will	take	bigger	responsibility”;	
•	 “Called	on	the	carpet”;	
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•	 “Expect	tougher	decisions”;
•	 “See	shifts”;
•	 “The	decision	to	leave	on	the	post”;
•	 “Why	were	the	searches	conducted	wherever?”;
•	 “The	most	important	are	the	child’s	interests”;
•	 “Will	offer	candidacy”;
•	 “The	decisions	must	be	made	immediately”;	
•	 “Is	looking	for	a	General	Prosecutor”;	
•	 “It	is	necessary	to	keep	peace	and	to	act	in	a	civilized	way”	[Adviser	to	
the President], “The Kaunas events are a painful lesson for the State” 
[Adviser to the President]. 
This parlance, which has consistently accompanied the Head of State since 
her inauguration and which is reflected in such phrases as “I will be an active 
president” and “will fight,” also shifts to the public crime and criminal justice 
discourse. Such rhetoric aims to strengthen authority and power. However, 
at the same time, such language is both impressive and manipulative, since it 
only provides the public with a certain contour, allowing the audience to fill 
in the emerged space with their expectations. In this way, a public political 
claim for crime knowledge becomes one of the ways to mobilize public sup-
port, through the vote for their power, leadership and represented ideology. 
Within this context, the pedophilia scandal became a public relations instru-
ment of the representatives of the political field, a reinforcement tool for their 
symbolic capital. Having an opinion on the pedophilia case became an integral 
part of the political agenda, whilst having a harsh opinion became essential for 
increasing one’s ratings.
In other words, the language of the economic field and all the mechanisms 
related to it are penetrating the functioning of the political field, which in turn 
clearly impacts on public crime discourse. Thus, in this case, one could ob-
serve not only the example of mass media’s influence on shaping political and 
public agendas and in excluding other more important topics out of public 
discourse (i.e., budget cuts, rising electricity costs, amendments to the Labor 
Law etc.), but also their synoptical functioning (especially in the case of televi-
sion) – when the audience’s eyes are focused not only on selective events, but 
also on those few who are given the right to comment on these events, which, 
in the process, directs viewer focus in predetermined ideological directions.
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In turn speaking about the participation of political actors in investiga-
tive journalism programs, one could make an assumption that the more active 
participation of the representatives of the political field on the channel TV3 
was influenced by the “pro-Kedys” position (i.e., in favor of the girl’s father) 
that was chosen by the program. This approach was generally profitable in 
terms of both financial and political capital. The LnK channel’s program chose 
a different – “anti-Kedys” (i.e., in favor of the girl’s mother) scenario. During 
the period of research, if a politician was to have a role in this script, it could 
have had negative consequences for the politician’s popularity. However, rela-
tively non-active political participation in these shows in general (as opposed 
to news portals) was probably mostly determined by the program’s genre itself, 
best described as infotainment. Logically, the genre of the TV show had a sig-
nificant influence in determining the cast. 
Both commercial channels very often presented commentaries of “people 
from the street.” The genre of such shows prioritizes personal opinions, emo-
tional punitive reactions and similar aspects over objectivity, factuality and 
professionalism (as in case of the news), corresponding to the role of an expert. 
However, professional comments, generally made by criminal justice officials, 
were presented almost in every program. These are generally used in order to 
give an illusion of objectivity to the mediated story. 
Sociologically speaking, it is important to see that within the context of 
such programs, individuals are more akin to agents occupying a certain posi-
tion, for instance, in political, legal or academic fields, whereas the journalist 
represents an actor from the journalistic field. Thus, the relationship of the 
journalist with the guests of the program reflects the structure of interaction 
between the journalistic field and the field represented by the other partici-
pants. For example, objectivity, which is assigned to academics commenting 
on certain events in the media (i. e., the pedophilia scandal), is related not to 
their individual characteristics, but rather to the objective status of the aca-
demic field. However, the very agreement of representatives of the authorita-
tive fields to take part in such programs contributes to the legitimation of the 
television’s constructed discourse, (i. e., a certain language and way of think-
ing, and hence the shaping of the worldview).
In the case of the construction of criminal knowledge and penal attitudes, 
the journalistic field creates and foists upon others a very specific vision of 
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the political, legal and civil fields. The content of the vision is a product of the 
journalistic field and its manufactured interests. Bourdieu argues that in the 
modern world, the need for constant and engaging entertainment drives mass 
media to use “animators” rather than serious commentators and reporters; 
also, it drives the media to deliver information that provides entertainment 
(i.e., meaningless talk show formats) instead of serious, analytical information 
and its discussion (бурдье 2002, pp. 152-153).
To defend this simplified, demagogic form of presenting criminal stories 
(such as was the investigation of pedophilia case trials in the analyzed pro-
grams), journalists often claim they are meeting the expectations of their au-
diences. In fact, it is they who also assign their own preferences and attitudes 
in covering crime problems to the public, which is a direct reflection of the 
functioning of the journalistic field and its dependence upon market logic.
In this case, commercial television, in applying this logic for crime infor-
mation/news production, prioritizes confrontations over rational debates and 
highlights the confrontation between individuals rather than the differences 
in their arguments. The title of one Lithuanian show, Confrontation, both sym-
bolically and metaphorically represents this point. In short, journalists are 
more interested in the game, its players, the tactics they use, and the effect 
which is caused by certain rhetoric in the relevant field, rather than actual 
informative content and the essence of what the characters represent (бурдье 
2002, p. 154). 
Bourdieu notes that the media’s natural commercial orientation towards 
entertainment involuntarily directs the viewer’s attention towards a certain 
spectacle or scandal each time when an important, however, seemingly boring 
political issue emerges. So, for example, as in the case of the pedophilia scan-
dal, information which is called “news” is reduced to the chronicling of “inter-
esting events” – and the story is produced in a borderline form between factual 
events and a show, and which is chaotically presented through a set of diverse 
events, occurring one after another only due to chronological coincidence – a 
scandalous criminal procedure, a civil war in Africa, the banking crisis, the 
loss of a basketball team, an aviation disaster, a bad weather forecast etc. Due 
to the already mentioned particularities of media information production, the 
presentation of events is usually restricted to the “here and now” context, thus 
separating criminal problems from their causes and long-term consequences. 
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Such fragmentation and superficial portrayal of crime reality is supported by 
the “thinking this day” logic and constant competition over defining and sell-
ing what is important and new (sensations), which in turn condemns journal-
ists to the constant daily search for news and the construction of incoherent, 
scattered impressions and images of crime reality (бурдье 2002, p. 157). Due 
to journalists’ lack of interest and information, their mediated criminal knowl-
edge and attitudes lack appropriate social context; thus, events are separated 
from the system of relations that actually determine them. This result was ob-
served in the coverage of the pedophilia scandal. For instance, the structure of 
the criminal justice system depends on criminal justice policy. criminal jus-
tice policy is in turn related to other political strategies, which are influenced 
by general state policy, which is in turn related to culture, as well as other social 
interests, which are determined by power relations and so on. Thus, during the 
coverage of the pedophilia story, the focus was generally given to the events 
happening “here and now” or actions with an observable outcome and not to 
this critical, broader, systemic context.
So, the logic of the journalistic field – due to the form that competitive 
struggle accordingly influences the production routine of crime news – con-
structs crime news as a series of absurd, unrelated events, which are impos-
sible to understand and prevent. Thus, to media consumers, there emerges an 
incomprehensible world, full of violence, aggression, crime, threats, a world 
from which one should hide and be aware of. In this case, the presentation 
of false information about crime reality, including constantly growing occur-
rences of violence and crime and an “epidemic” of sexual crimes, for example, 
feeds a feeling of anxiety in society and the notion that applied security meas-
ures are insufficient. In this context, public dissatisfaction surfaces leading to 
demands to harden existing security measures and to establish stiffer punish-
ments for the violation of public interest. Representatives of the political field 
who seek to mobilize potential voter support usually advocate such changes. 
In general, there is an impression that the worldview, which emerges for view-
ers from television or other means of mass media, is very difficult to change.
In the case of criminal problems (such as pedophilia), this vision of reality 
is further enhanced by the sense that crime is an object of a legal and political 
game – a matter for professionals. Bourdieu notes that such a portrayal of real-
ity promotes a so-called public, fatalistic disinvolvement, particularly among 
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the least politicized viewers, whilst simultaneously ensuring the preservation 
of the existing order and its legitimacy (бурдье 2002, p. 159).
As applied in the case at hand, the moral panic resulting from the pedo-
philia scandal did not cause changes in the social structure itself – but rather 
in the personnel functioning within it. Thus, despite the negative image of the 
criminal justice system in the pedophilia case, which prevailed during the pe-
riod of research, the structure did not change. In this case, mass media per-
formed one of its main functions. It maintained and legitimated the existing 
social order by showing that, in the cases of legal infringement and conflict 
between a perpetrator and a victim, the matter is “legitimately” given into the 
hands of the state, which exercises monopolistic authority over such matters. 
Thus, community conflicts are monopolized and regulated by professionals 
– judges, lawyers, police officers, doctors, criminologists, the organization of 
society’s social structure itself and the mass media.
n. christie (1977) claims that this happened due to the state’s aim to reduce 
conflicts and protect victims. However, modern trends towards a crime con-
trol industry-oriented state reminds one more of a “professional thief ” who 
takes away conflicts from the community and uses them to serve his/her in-
dividual interests (christie, 1977). criminologists often play a supporting role 
in this case, assisting professionals working in the system of crime control. 
christie claims that by focusing our attention on the offender, “we” have made 
him/her an object of manipulation and control. Together, “we” contributed to 
all of the factors that reduced a victim to a non-existent entity, and an accused 
person – to a thing (christie, 1977). In other words, the conflicts have become 
a professional space of conflict. christie notes that the organization of the ba-
sic social structure, as well as the manipulations by professionals, have further 
exacerbated the current issue. Individuals are increasingly defined based on 
their roles. Members of the society are segregated by gender, age, ethnic origin, 
physical limitations and so on. All of these contribute to the depersonalization 
of individuals, and a lack of mutual information share and mutual understand-
ing. In this case, the division of the labor organization further complicates 
these consequences. Thus, when a conflict emerges, members of the society are 
unable to cope with the situation themselves.
on this background, professionals “legally” steal conflicts from society and 
legitimize this through the socialization process and the internalization of this 
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“theft.” Individuals are taught from a young age that conflicts can hurt others 
and bring harm to the social system, and that governmental officials, officers, 
and institutions are necessary to restrain society from personal revenge and 
vendetta. Mass media in this context becomes one of the social institutions 
affirming and preserving this status quo. In the case of the coverage of the 
pedophilia scandal in Lithuanian media, one could observe how the solution 
of the conflict, which emerged in the community (a family conflict) became 
the undisputed property of both the legal and political fields. crime reality and 
criminal knowledge in public discourse are thus established as the discourse of 
professionals and adopted by legal, political, scientific and journalistic fields.
Thus, mass media, being one of the most important cultural mediators 
constructing crime knowledge and attitudes, reproduces social powers and 
their distribution in society’s social structure.
At the same time, it should be noted that a distorted presentation of crime 
and criminal justice is inherent in politically organized societies, where, ac-
cording to R. Quinney (2004), the state is the core of criminal knowledge. In 
such societies, the social construction of a crime reality is a political act, which 
implies social and mind control, legitimating the “regimes of truth” and re-
moving the unwanted discourses. All these political processes find their place 
and are reflected in the structure of public discourse.
An analysis of the representatives of the social fields that are given the right 
to define, comment upon and suggest solutions to the problem of crime showed 
that the public discourse of crime and criminal justice, primarily, is a profession-
al discourse (criminal justice officials, policy makers, less often – academics). In 
turn, the ordinary members of society more often play the role of passive observ-
ers. In other words, society’s social hierarchy in media discourse is reproduced 
through the so-called “rhetoric credibility hierarchy” (i.e., the “credible experts” 
who are provided with the ground to speak in media discourse) and, thereby, 
confirms the legitimacy of the social structure (van Dijk, 2009).
It should be emphasized that crime knowledge is embodied. In the pub-
lic discourse, it is mediated by so-called “claim-makers” who are representing 
certain social segments and competing with each other for the recognition 
of their proposed constructions of social reality. To land their constructions 
and to establish their power, they not only sometimes employ populistic argu-
ments, which are quite often based on stereotypes, but invoke certain concep-
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tual frames, which are based on factual and interpretative claims and advocate 
corresponding ways to define and solve problems (Surette 2011, pp. 38-40). In 
this case, the social construct that wins gives power to the group representing 
it. For instance, the most popular frames used by claim-makers in the pedo-
philia scandal narrative were the “faulty criminal justice system” and “social 
breakdown” frames. They then recommended the strategies of harsher social 
control and stronger community engagement, thus a fostering of stronger pe-
nal attitudes, intolerance towards “non-traditional” forms of the family and 
conservative attitudes toward problem solving, respectively. In the case of the 
“social breakdown” frame, its conservative version, which denoted liberal atti-
tudes towards moral issues as the cause of social breakdown (i.e., cohabitation, 
non-marital childbearing etc.), corresponded not only to the simultaneously 
occurring polemic on family concept in the public discourse, but also to a 
broader political discourse, i.e., the prevailing conservative ideology.    
In other words, the public discourse on crime and criminal justice is also an 
arena for the struggle and competition for symbolic resources between interest 
groups. Here one could also observe the power of the media that is exercised 
while filtering certain constructions, usually favoring those positions that are 
dramatic, sponsored by powerful groups and are related to pre-established cul-
tural themes (Surette 2011).
It should also be noted that mass media, by defining the form and content of 
thinking and talking about the crime reality for the representatives of political 
and legal field and society at large, itself becomes a producer of crime knowledge 
and reinforces certain attitudes. This shows the mediatization of these profes-
sional fields and highlights their vulnerability to the market field logic emanat-
ing from media production output. At the same time, it reflects Bourdieu’s claim 
of the “perverse principles of direct democracy” in the reception of crime and 
criminal justice. While the journalistic field, in order to provide the illusion of 
truthfulness and authority for its constructed public discourse, makes use of the 
structural elements of legal, political and academic fields. 
Thus, mass media’s constructed structure of knowledge and its proposed 
attitudes toward crime and criminal justice reflect the one‘s of the society, 
where the discourse is given meaning. While, on the other hand, mass media‘s 
manufactured knowledge and produced attitudes reflect the functioning of its 
inner ideology, conveying the ways in which information is selected, processed 
and disseminated. 
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commercial mass media industry factors, functioning under the condi-
tions of free market economy, create an environment for media to become 
the amplifiers of moral panic and deviance in society. Depending upon the 
economic factors influencing its functioning and reflecting the existing social 
structure of which it is part, the mass media can invoke (as in the case of the 
pedophilia story) the amplification of deviance in society. By applying routine 
techniques of knowledge production, the media can turn separate events into 
a safe and convenient construct of bigger social problems as the actual cause, 
usually designating “outside” groups and, thus, “giving an explanation” of why 
law enforcement institutions do not succeed with completely eradicating these 
emerging problems.
In many cases, behind the excessive escalation of a certain issue in the mass 
media lies the protection of a certain political approach that offers the cor-
responding solution strategies. Political actors in the political field, following 
the principles market logic, resonate criminal issues in the public discourse to 
strengthen their political capital, mobilize electoral support or to draw public 
attention away from the system’s problems. Through this, they directly partici-
pate in deviance amplification. Moral panic and the narratives that give mean-
ing to it have the potential to become criminal myths, preserve the status quo 
and designate “others” as scapegoats for the problems, the roots of which lie in 
the system itself or in the hands of empowered actors. 
The conducted broader media content analysis has shown that govern-
mental institutions, such as the criminal justice system or its separate compo-
nents, can be scapegoated. During moral panic, criminal justice institutions, 
experiencing constant pressure from politicians, the public and the media, 
themselves get involved in deviance amplification. In such a context, criminal 
prosecution practices towards certain social groups become harsher, and there 
is an internal institutional reallocation of human resources toward investigat-
ing a “new” social evil. Quite often, law enforcement institutions start to focus 
more on quantitative rather than qualitative outcomes, which in turn impacts 
upon the effective functioning of these institutions and their ability to identify 
relevant public security problems. All of these factors can reduce public trust 
in the criminal justice system, undermine engrained democratic principles in 
criminal justice policy, stimulate the growing, unsubstantiated fear of crime 
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and lead to the intensification of punitive attitudes in society as well as public 
alienation and demoralization. 
For instance, the secondary-data analysis revealed that during the research 
period, among the main criminal justice institutions (police, prosecutor office, 
courts), the highest public distrust rate was toward the prosecutor’s office and 
the courts (Vilmorus, 2009-2010). These institutions also received mostly neg-
ative attention in the public discourse during the pedophile scandal. In 2010 
(in 2009, the trust/distrust in prosecutor officer was not measured), 46.4 per-
cent of Lithuanian citizens distrusted the prosecutors’ office, and only 13.7 
percent expressed trust.  The public courts were distrusted by 46.9 percent of 
citizens, 6.8 percent greater than in 2009,  while trust in public courts stayed 
near constant in 2010 at 13.7 percent. 
With regard to the impact of moral panic on society and the functioning of 
criminal justice institutions, the crime statistic shows that the number of vic-
tims of children sexual abuse (corresponding to Lithuanian criminal code’s ten 
articles) in 2008-2010 was increasing. In 2008-2009, it increased by 4.8 percent 
(176 victims), increasing by another 12.5 percent in 2012 (198 victims). The 
biggest increase was noticed between the victims of molestation of minors. In 
2009-2010, the number grew by 44.7 percent – from 38 to 55 victims.  In 2010, 
there were 223 persons accused of this group of crimes – the highest number 
in the last seven years and 2.2 times more than in 2004. There were also 413 
investigated criminal cases of child abuse versus only 241 cases in 2009, an 
increase of 71.4 percent. 
courts statistics also show that in 2009-2010, there was an increase in court 
proceedings related to the molestation of minors by 60 percent, (from 20 to 32 
cases). Simultaneously, during this period, there was a 64.3 percent increase 
in pending or incomplete cases – from 14 to 23 cases. At the same time, the 
number of finished criminal proceedings on molestation of minors in 2009-
2010 had doubled – from 12 to 24 cases. The dynamics of the duration of court 
proceedings on cases of molestation of minors also increased in 2009-2010. 
The number of cases where court hearings took up to 6 months increased by 
almost twice: from 8 to 15 cases. The same increase happened with the cases of 
6-12-month duration: from 4 to 7 cases.  Interestingly, in 2008 and 2009, there 
were no court hearings that lasted more than 12 months, whereas in 2010 there 
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were 2. The following numbers indicate a significant increase in the workload 
of the criminal justice system and, perhaps, certain signs of decrease in their 
effectiveness.  
Thus, while the lifetime of moral panic in public discourse is quite short, its 
effects in the society are generally felt for quite a long time.
FInAL REMARKS 
In contemporary society, mass media is the space where social, cultural 
and moral values  of society are reproduced. By transmitting symbolic content, 
they mediate the normative constructs of the world, thus legitimizing the sta-
tus quo or reflecting the “accepted” changes taking place in the social organiza-
tion of the society and the power distribution field.
As the main source of information about crime and criminal justice, mass 
media significantly influences public knowledge about the reality of crime. 
Through the disposition of this “synoptic” power, mass media contributes to 
the shaping and framing of its content, which is influenced by the normative 
contours of the society and the commercial media industry operating under 
the logic of the free market economy.
However, it must be noted that the construction and maintenance of this 
distorted picture of crime reality can have important political ramifications. 
The definition of prevalent social reality is defined by specific individuals and 
groups within a sociopolitical power construct. Thus, in this case as well, the 
social construction of crime is inherently a political act, characterized by so-
cial and cognitive control, which legitimizes the “truth regimes” and silences 
“unwanted” discourse.  
crime reality and knowledge in the public discourse are legitimized as a 
professional discourse. They are subsequently captured and contorted by ac-
tors in the legal, political and, subsequently, journalistic fields. Political actors 
may make use of the “sensational,” “popular” criminal problems and, through 
populist rhetoric, strengthen their political capital and maintain electorate 
support.
Therefore, relatedly, behind the excessive escalation of a social problem in 
the media, often one finds an intention to protect or justify a certain policy and 
its corresponding solution set. In this context, crime narratives and crime and 
justice “frames” are used to legitimate certain political strategies. Moral panic 
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outbreaks are perhaps the most indicative of this phenomenon given that the 
power elite can use such events to distract public attention from more system-
atic societal challenges. In this manner, the moral panic, coupled with the nar-
ratives that are used to give meaning to it, preserves the status quo and those 
who are in power. It does so by placing the source of a particular problem on 
generally “unpopular” social elements who become scapegoats for problems 
that are systemic in nature, but which those in power are unwilling or unable 
to address. 
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